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I. INTRODUCTION
Arguments for the right to have an abortion range from allowing
abortions only when necessary to save a woman’s life to, most broadly,
allowing abortions for socio-economic reasons or simply upon request.
The most liberal arguments support a “right to voluntary mother-
hood.”1  Under these arguments, the right to obtain an abortion is “ar-
guably integral to a constellation of other fundamental human rights
such as women’s right of equality, life, health, security of person, pri-
vate and family life, freedom of religion, conscience and opinion, and
freedom from slavery, torture and cruel, and inhuman and/or degrad-
ing treatment.”2  Furthermore, “women’s right to self determination
falls under the overarching freedom in decision-making about private
matters. Such provisions include protections of the right to physical
integrity, the right to decide freely and responsibly the number and
spacing of one’s children and the right to privacy.”3
Although there are a number of different arguments that may be
raised in support of a right to abortion, the most convincing argu-
ments focus on three different sets of circumstances.  The first is when
the mother invokes her right to life over that of her unborn child.  The
second set of circumstances occurs when a mother invokes her abor-
tion rights on the preservation of her health.  In such situations, the
mother’s interest in her own well-being competes with the unborn
child’s right to life.  The third situation in which abortion rights have
their strongest hold in international law is when the woman seeks an
abortion for a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest.  Interests in
voluntary motherhood and the right to reproductive health usually
underlie this situation.
This Comment proposes that outside of these three situations, any
argument that access to abortion is a human right is groundless.  Fur-
thermore, although these three situations present the best arguments
for a right to abortion, it remains difficult to claim that even these
situations rise to the level of a right under international law.
Part II of this Comment discusses the current state of legal affairs
regarding the so-called right to abortion in two sections.  Section II.A
discusses the current international system of human rights under the
United Nations (UN).  This Comment analyzes the relevant UN
1. Christina Zampas & Jaime M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right—International
and Regional Standards, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 287 (2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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materials pointing to the state of a right to abortion under interna-
tional law.  This Comment concludes that although there is ample dis-
cussion of a right to abortion, such a right does not yet exist under
international law.  At best, the UN has, in certain situations, repeat-
edly urged Member States to recognize exceptions to their general
prohibitions of abortion.  Of course, the UN has not expressly stated
that there is not a right to abortion.  However, certain UN agencies
have urged that abortion not be used as a method of family planning.4
Section II.B examines the current state of affairs concerning  re-
gional systems of human rights, namely, the European Convention on
Human Rights and the Organization of American States (OAS).  The
European Court of Human Rights has noted that there is much con-
troversy as to when the legal right to life ought to begin.5  Because of
this controversy, the Court has taken a hands-off approach on the is-
sue of when life begins,6 leaving the question to the discretion of the
individual State.7  However, the Court has acknowledged that the
same exceptional cases for access to abortion seem to exist as under
the UN.8  The situation is somewhat different under the OAS system.
The OAS system formally protects the right to life starting at concep-
tion.9  However, in practice the OAS does not fully uphold this protec-
tion, as it allows for similar exceptions as provided by the European
system and the UN.10  Under both the European and OAS systems,
allowing for abortion in exceptional cases might ultimately be some-
thing on which both sides of the issue can compromise.
Part III of this Comment will discuss the role of the Holy See in
international human rights.  The Roman Catholic Church has been
one of the leading developers of a system of human rights within the
Western world, in part due to its long institutional history and its mis-
sion to love as Christ loved.  This Comment will analyze the role of the
Catholic Church in three ways.  First, it will give a general overview of
the Catholic Church’s cohesive and immutable teaching on abortion
according to its magisterial power based on Scripture and Sacred Tra-
4. See Jill M. Bracken, Respecting Human Rights in Population Policies: An Interna-
tional Customary Right to Reproductive Choice, 6 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 197,
228 (1995).
5. Tysiac v. Poland, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 42, ¶ 104 (2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp
197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=814538&portal=hbkm&source=external
bydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
6. See infra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
7. Tysiac, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 74 (noting that “legislative provisions as to when life
commenced fell within the State’s margin of appreciation”).
8. Id. ¶ 107 (discussing the mother’s physical integrity); id. ¶ 119 (discussing the
mother’s health interest); id.¶ 50 (discussing restrictive laws on abortion pertain-
ing to situations of rape).
9. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 4,
§ 1, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
10. See infra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
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dition.  Second, it will provide a brief overview of the history of the
Church and human rights by highlighting the influence and progress
during the late-Middle Ages by individuals such as Bartolome´ de las
Casas, Francisco Sua´rez, and Francisco de Vittoria; noting the in-
volvement of Vatican City as a sovereign nation in the early organized
human rights dialogue; discussing the influence of Jacques Maritain,
a prominent Catholic and French philosopher, on international
human rights; and by providing background on the Church’s current
involvement. Finally, this Comment will analyze what the Holy See,
as a Permanent Observer to the United Nations, can offer the human
rights discourse concerning the issue of abortion.
II. ABORTION: CURRENT STATE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS
A. International System of Human Rights
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted
by the UN General Assembly in December 1948.11  The UDHR was
the “first comprehensive human rights instrument to be proclaimed by
a global international organization.”12  The document can be catego-
rized into two broad categories of rights, namely, civil and political
rights and social, economic, and cultural rights.13  Examples of civil
and political rights are “the right to life, liberty, and security of per-
son; the prohibition of slavery, of torture and cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment . . . freedom of speech, religion, assembly and
freedom of movement.”14  Examples of cultural, social, and economic
rights are “the individual’s right to social security, to work, and to
‘protection against unemployment,’ to ‘equal pay for work,’ and to ‘just
and favorable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an
existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary,
by other means of social protection,’”15 as well as the “right ‘to rest
and leisure’” and the right “‘to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family.’”16
Although the UDHR is not a treaty and it lacks binding legal force,
its legal effect is not questioned, and at least some of its provisions
have the force of customary international law.17 Rather, the dispute
11. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
12. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: IN A NUTSHELL 35
(3d ed. 2002).
13. Id. (citing UDHR, supra note 11, arts. 3–5, 13, 18–20).
14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting UDHR, supra note 11, arts. 22–23).
16. Id. at 37 (quoting UDHR, supra note 11, art. 24).
17. Id. at 39 (stating that “few international lawyers would deny that the Declaration
is a normative instrument that creates or at least reflects some legal obligations
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over its legal effect concerns which provisions are binding and under
what circumstances they are said to be binding.  There is also dispute
as to whether the document derives its binding effect from its “author-
itative interpretation of the human rights obligations contained in the
UN Charter, its status as customary international law, or its status as
a general principle of law.”18
The UDHR contains no explicit reference to a right to abortion.
However, scholars have argued that various articles of the Declara-
tion, implicitly or when interpreted as an integral whole, contain a
right to abortion.19  The articles that are pertinent to a dialogue on
this issue are: Article One (all humans born free and equal in dignity
and rights); Article Two (prohibits discrimination based on sex); Arti-
cle Three (right to life); Article Five (freedom from torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment); Article Twelve
(right to privacy); Article Eighteen (freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion); Article Nineteen (freedom of opinion and expression);
Article Twenty-five (special care of motherhood and childhood); Article
Twenty-nine (prohibits exercise of the rights and freedoms listed con-
trary to the purpose and principles of the UN); and Article Thirty (no
activity or performance can aim at the destruction of the rights or
freedoms listed).20  However, each one of these provisions of the
UDHR point in different directions.  Some, such as Articles One or
Ten, seem to point in favor of protecting the unborn child.  Still others,
such as Articles Two or Twelve, seem to apply directly in favor of the
mother.  Others cut both ways, such as Article Twenty-five.  In addi-
tion, Article Eighteen could involve considerations involving addi-
tional parties, since it could be read as prohibiting the enforcement of
a right where it is contrary to a person’s belief, conscience, or religion.
For instance, a mother seeking to invoke a right to abortion might face
the countervailing right of a medical professional who objects to per-
forming the procedure based on Article Eighteen.
This quick glance at the many different human rights provisions
relevant to a right to abortion gives a clear example of the diverse
views in which the rights may be used for and against the arguments
on a right to abortion.  Most of these rights contained in the UDHR
for the Member States of the UN”).   Customary international law “results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT); see also Bracken, supra note
4, at 207–10 (explaining the sources and nature of customary international law).
18. Id. at 39–40; see also id. at 41–43 (discussing three different arguments about the
UDHR’s binding legal effect).
19. See, e.g., Tatyana A. Margolin, Abortion as a Human Right, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L.
REP. 77, 82 (2008) (arguing that the right is implicit in different articles of the
UDHR).
20. UDHR, supra note 11, arts. 1–3, 5, 12, 18, 19, 25, 29, 30.
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exist in other UN documents either explicitly or by implication, and
this Comment will mostly analyze these rights under other human
rights documents.
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
As an international treaty, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) has binding legal force on the state par-
ties that have ratified the Covenant.21  Issues that pertain to “compli-
ance with and the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the [ICCPR]
are matters of international concern and thus are no longer exclu-
sively within their domestic jurisdiction.”22  It is also arguable that
even states that are not parties to the ICCPR may be bound, to some
degree, to the extent that the Covenant merely codifies existing princi-
ples of customary international law.23
Article Twenty-Eight of the ICCPR establishes the Human Rights
Committee (HRC).24  The HRC was created to ensure that States Par-
ties to the treaty meet their obligations under the ICCPR.25  The main
function of the HRC is to review the reports of States Parties; in re-
turn, the HRC provides general comments on the state of human
rights within that State.26  These reports and general comments carry
different degrees of authority and sometimes no authority at all.27  In
recent years, the reporting system has evolved and expanded, trans-
forming the ICCPR into a much more effective document.28  An impor-
tant source of authority that this Comment will analyze below is the
effect of the HRC’s reports as “soft law” and their potential effect on
human rights.29
21. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
22. BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 12, at 44.
23. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 102 cmts. f & i.
24. See ICCPR, supra note 21.
25. BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 12, at 49.
26. See ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 40.
27. See, e.g., BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 12, at 52–56; Lise Johnson, “You Can
Violate The Rights of Undocumented Persons With Impunity”: The Shocking Mes-
sage Arizona’s Constitution Sends and Its Inconsistency With International Law,
13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 491 n.110 (2010) (explaining that the interpretations
of the HRC, “while non-binding, are authoritative interpretations” of the ICCPR).
28. BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 12, at 51 (e.g., use of conclusions concerning the
state of human rights in individual States in the annual committee reports, re-
porting of major violations to the UN Secretary General, and providing general
comments or interpretations of provisions within the Covenant).
29. For further discussion of the HRC, see infra notes 38–85 and accompanying text.
In the context of international law, “soft law” refers to the “[g]uidelines, policy
declarations, or codes of conduct that set standards of conduct but are not legally
binding.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1519 (9th ed. 2009).
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3. Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women
The Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) is another document that does not specifi-
cally address abortion.30  However, the CEDAW Committee31 has ap-
proached the issue of abortion and its effect on women’s health and
equality.  The CEDAW Committee has mostly focused on the correla-
tion between restrictive abortion laws and high rates of unsafe abor-
tions that can endanger a woman’s life and health.32  The Committee
has also approached the issue of abortion with regard to women who
have suffered physical or sexual violence.33  This was addressed under
Article Twelve of the Covenant, which protects women’s right to
health and well-being.34  Overall, the Committee’s call for access to
abortion must be read narrowly to pertain to the limited situations
that have been addressed, such as pregnancies resulting from physical
or sexual violence.  It would be a stretch to argue, as some do,35 that
the CEDAW could be used to create a right to abortion on demand or
for socio-economic reasons.  Furthermore, access to abortion, under
the circumstances that have been recommended, should not be misun-
derstood to be a method of family planning.36
4. The 1994 Cairo Conference and the 1995 Beijing Conference
The 1994 International Conference on Population and Develop-
ment in Cairo, Egypt, is another instance where an international right
to abortion was denounced.37  The Conference reaffirmed the exis-
tence of an international right to reproductive choice,38 but one would
be remiss to think that the term “reproductive choice” stands for an
international right to abortion.39  The 1994 Conference confirmed that
abortion should not be a method of family planning and that un-
wanted pregnancies should be avoided in order to eliminate the need
30. See Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter CEDAW].
31. Article Seventeen of the CEDAW creates the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women. See id. art. 17.
32. Zampas & Gher, supra note 1, at 259.
33. See, e.g., id. at 281–82.
34. See CEDAW, supra note 30, art. 12.
35. See, e.g., Zampas & Gher, supra note 1, at 287.
36. Id. at 272.
37. See International Conference on Population and Development, Sept. 5–13, 1994,
Programme of Action of the Conference, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/L.4 (May 13,
1994).
38. See Bracken, supra note 4, at 211–15 (discussing the history of the right to repro-
ductive choice and noting that, by the 1994 Conference, the right was “well-
defined”).
39. See id. at 224–32.
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for abortion.40  In fact, many countries stated reservations on the is-
sue of abortion,41 including the Holy See, whose main advocacy was
seeking consensus at the theoretical level.42
The 1994 Conference itself was not intended to create any new in-
ternational rights but rather “affirms the application of universally
recognized human rights standards to all aspects of population
programmes.”43  The document that came out of the Conference is not
strictly binding, but the “statements contained in these documents are
persuasive and indicative of the world community’s growing support
for reproductive rights, and are often used to support legislative and
policy reform, as well as interpretations of national and international
law.”44  This understanding of the 1994 Conference very strongly sug-
gests that there is no international right to abortion.
Similar issues arose in the 1995 World Conference on Women.45
This conference eventually turned to the issue of pregnancy, which
resulted in a “fierce debate” and an ambiguous paragraph 94 on “re-
productive health” in the conference’s “Platform for Action.”46  Even
though these ambiguities might create a basis for arguing for a right
to abortion, nothing in the 1995 Conference’s Platform for Action es-
tablishes such an international right.47  In fact, the Platform used lan-
guage similar to that used in the 1994 Conference concerning abortion
and national governments.  The 1995 Platform for Action stated that
“[a]ny measures or changes related to abortion within the health sys-
tem can only be determined at the national or local level according to
the national legislative process.”48
These two conferences clearly demonstrate that the issue of abor-
tion as an international right is and will continue to be a contentious
issue.  Moreover, the conferences are strong evidence that there is no
right to abortion under international law.
B. Current State of Law
The current state of the law is disputed and nuanced because of the
interrelation between the various human rights documents, only some
40. Id. at 228–32.
41. Id. at 228–32.
42. William Joseph Wagner, Universal Human Rights, the United Nations, and the
Telos of Human Dignity, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 197, 218 (2005).
43. International Conference on Population and Development, supra note 37.
44. Zampas & Gher, supra note 1, at 253.
45. See Fourth World Conference on Women, Sept. 4–15, 1995, Beijing Declaration
and Platform for Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (Oct. 17, 1995) [herein-
after Beijing Platform for Action].
46. Richard G. Wilkins & Jacob Reynolds, International Law and the Right to Life, 4
AVE MARIA L. REV. 123, 152 (2006).
47. Id. at 152–53 (discussing Beijing Platform for Action, supra note 45, ¶ 94).
48. Id. at 153 (quoting Beijing Platform for Action, supra note 45, ¶ 106(k)).
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of which are binding, and the lack of guidance from the international
courts.  However, three different views on abortion as a right under
international law may be ascertained.  First, there is the view that a
complete ban on abortion is permissible and necessary in order to pro-
tect the life of the unborn child.49  This protection of the unborn child
ensures that the right to life, the most important of all rights, is not
violated.  Under this view, the human person ought to be protected
from conception until natural death.  Any attempt to take the life of
unborn children is a grave crime against those people and a threat to
their inherent dignity and rights.
Second, there is the moderate view, which arguably espouses the
current state of international law.50  This view is predominantly con-
cerned with protecting the mother’s interests in cases where carrying
to term might result in death or bodily injury or when the pregnancy
is the result of rape or incest.  Under these circumstances, the
mother’s right to life often prevails over any possible right to life of the
unborn child.  Outside of these circumstances, however, the right to
life of an unborn child is largely uncertain.  This understanding of the
law permits for more deference to states to balance the rights of the
mother and unborn child as they see fit.  This understanding of the
law is ambiguous by its very nature.  It refrains from definitively an-
swering the question of whether an unborn child has a right to life.
The third view is that the law ought to do what is necessary to
knock down any barriers to unfettered access to abortion.51  This un-
derstanding of the law envisions and advocates for a progressive and
liberalized reading of the right to life, which would inevitably grant
the mother a free license to seek an abortion at any time she desires—
whether for health concerns or for other reasons.
1. Complete Ban on Abortion
Under the international system of human rights, countries that
maintain complete bans on abortion in order to protect life from con-
ception to natural death have been unpopular and criticized as viola-
tions of women’s human rights.52  Many of these countries will be
identified below in the various reports of the HRC from the last
twenty years.53  Basically, the criticism of states that have formal
laws banning abortion on all grounds is that they violate women’s
rights to life and health and force women into unwanted pregnancies,
49. For further discussion of this view, see infra subsection II.B.1.
50. For more information on this view, see infra subsection II.B.2.
51. For further discussion of this view, see infra subsection II.B.3.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 93–132.
53. Id.
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even when they result from rape or incest.54  Other states, while for-
mally allowing for certain exceptions to prohibitions on abortion, in
effect have complete bans on abortion.55  The UN has been fairly
harsh in its criticism of these countries.  For example, as will be dis-
cussed below, Poland has been highly criticized for its minimal access
to abortion and the alleged abuse of conscience clauses by doctors,
which have combined to create a de facto prohibition on abortion.56
Certain South American countries (e.g., Venezuela and Paraguay), as
will be discussed later on, have also been criticized for their restrictive
views towards abortion.57  Overall, the international system of human
rights does not condone such prohibitions and harshly criticizes coun-
tries that place criminal sanctions on abortions.
2. Middle-of-the-Road: Maternal Interests v. Fetal Interests
Although the law itself is quite ambiguous, this section will at-
tempt to analyze what is arguably the current state of law under the
international human rights system.  To begin this analysis, it is help-
ful to understand how the right to life of an unborn child has been
defined (or not defined) under the relevant UN documents.  Christina
Zampas and Jaime Gher argue that any assertion that unborn chil-
dren have a right to life under international human rights law is “in-
compatible with women’s fundamental human rights to life, health,
and autonomy” and “such contentions have been defeated on various
occasions within both international and regional human rights
forums.”58
Some scholars have supported this argument with an historical
analysis of the UDHR, ICCPR, and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC).  They argue that Article Three of the UDHR, which
guarantees a right to life, is limited by Article One, which specifically
refers to all human beings who have been “born.”59  This reading is
affirmed by the drafting history of the UDHR: an amendment was pro-
posed and rejected which would have removed the word “born” in or-
54. See infra text accompanying notes 93, 103, 108–09 (discussing Chile, Kuwait, and
Peru).
55. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 98–99.  A “conscience clause” is a provision
designed to “protect health care providers’ rights to refuse to provide or partici-
pate in certain procedures to which they have moral or religious objections.”
Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14
J. LEGAL MED. 177, 177 (1993).
57. See infra text accompanying notes 110, 125–26
58. Zampas & Gher, supra note 1, at 262.
59. See Rhonda Copelon et al., Human Rights Begin at Birth: International Law and
the Claim of Fetal Rights, 13 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS, Nov. 2005, at 120,
121–22 (discussing UDHR, supra note 11, arts. 1, 3).
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der to protect pre-natal life.60  Similarly, the negotiation history of
Article Six of the ICCPR reveals that a similar amendment suggesting
that life should be protected from the moment of conception was pro-
posed and rejected.61  Manfred Nowak affirms that “life in the making
was not (or not from the point of conception) to be protected” under the
ICCPR.62  However, Nowak also states that the fact that protection
“was not to begin at the moment of conception does not permit one to
draw the conclusion that the unborn child is not protected whatsoever
by Art. 6.”63  Furthermore, as will be discussed below,64 the HRC has
called upon a number of states that are parties to the ICCPR to reform
their abortion laws to conform to the current state of human rights
law.
Additionally, Zampas and Gher refer to the Preamble of the CRC
and its travaux pre´paratoires.65  They point to paragraph nine of the
Preamble to the CRC, which states that “[b]earing in mind that, as
indicated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, ‘the child, by
reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safe-
guards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well
as after birth.’”66  They state that, “[a]t most, this language recognizes
a state’s duty to promote a child’s capacity to survive and thrive after
birth, by targeting the pregnant woman’s nutrition and health.”67
This “pre-natal language” is not meant “to infringe on any women’s
right to access abortion.”68  They point to two final reasons why the
CRC does not embrace a right to life beginning at conception.69  The
first is a failed amendment by the Holy See that attempted to protect
life “’before as well as after birth.”70  However, this argument is not
convincing, as the Preamble to the CRC, by its own terms, grants “le-
60. Id.
61. Zampras & Gher, supra note 1, at 262–63.  Article Six of the ICCPR proclaims,
“Every human being has the inherent right to life.”  International Covenant,
supra note 21, art. 6.
62. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COM-
MENTARY 154 (2d ed. 2005).
63. Id.; see id. at 153–55.
64. See infra notes 38–73 and accompanying text.
65. Zampas & Gher, supra note 1, at 263–64. “Travaux pre´paratoires” means the leg-
islative or drafting history of international law. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1538
(8th ed. 2004).
66. Zampas & Gher, supra note 1, at 263 (quoting Convention on the Rights of the




70. Id. (quoting U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Question of a
Convention on the Rights of a Child: Report of the Working Group, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/L/1542 (1980)).
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gal protection, before as well as after birth.”71  Second, Zampas and
Gher point to the Concluding Observations of the CRC, which state
that the definition of child does not include a fetus.72
Abby Janoff also argues against a right to life for the unborn child,
pointing to the ambiguity that exists within the CRC.73  She seizes
upon this ambiguity and makes a textual argument, but she cannot
point to any historical evidence or negotiation history that backs her
position.  She states that any right to life interest of a fetus “conflicts
directly with the rights guaranteed to a pregnant girl under the Con-
vention, which safeguard her right to health, to life, and to considera-
tion of her best interests if the pregnancy threatens her physical or
mental health.”74  However true such an argument may be, this obser-
vation only alleviates part of the definitional problem of when an un-
born child’s right to life begins.  If Janoff’s argument were accepted, it
would only touch on those situations where the pregnant mother may
run a risk to her life or physical or mental health.  This utilitarian
balancing of the rights of the mother and unborn child fails to answer
the questions of whether an unborn child has a right to life starting at
conception and whether the right to life of an unborn child has any
claim over any interest the mother might have in an abortion.
Because of this textual ambiguity regarding whether an unborn
child has a right to life from conception, it may be helpful to turn to
methods of treaty interpretation contained within the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties.75  It is true that a preamble, such as that
contained in the CRC, is not legally binding.76  However, Article
Thirty-One of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states
that preambles provide an important context for interpretation.77  In
this case, the Preamble to the CRC provides that “the child . . . needs
special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection,
before as well as after birth.”78  This provision provides reasonable
grounds for extending the right to life to unborn children.  At a bare
minimum, this should at least afford the unborn child a right to life
71. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/44/49, pmbl.
¶ 9 (Nov. 20, 1989).
72. Zampas & Gher, supra note 1, at 263–64.
73. Abby F. Janoff, Note, Rights of the Pregnant Child vs. Rights of the Unborn Child
Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 163, 164–65
(2004).
74. Id.
75. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
76. Karen A. McSweeney, Note, The Potential for Enforcement of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child: The Need to Improve the Information Base,
16 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 467, 473 (1993) (stating that “the preamble does
not create binding legal duties on states parties”).
77. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 75, art. 31.
78. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 66, pmbl. ¶ 9.
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under certain circumstances.  It would be necessary to recognize this
right to life as beginning absolutely where the conflicting right of a
pregnant child’s right to life, to health, and to consideration of her best
interest if the pregnancy threatens her physical or mental health
ends.  Unfortunately, then, this understanding is still quite
ambiguous.
Another option, as stated by the International Committee of the
Red Cross during the drafting process of the CRC, is to embrace ambi-
guity.  The Red Cross noted that while the notion of what a “child” is
was not made clear, “ ‘[t]his silence seems wise and will facilitate uni-
versal application of the Convention irrespective of local peculiari-
ties.’”79  By not defining the term “child,” individual states will have
room to adopt a meaning of the term that best fits their cultural cir-
cumstances.  There is no doubt, however, that such a case-by-case in-
terpretation of “child” would still fall under the scrutiny of
international human rights standards.  Nonetheless, this type of read-
ing at minimum allows countries to define these terms within their
cultural traditions and history.  The problem with this approach is
that, although a floor would be created below which States Parties80
would not be able to diminish women’s rights, there would be no com-
parable floor for the rights of unborn children.  Thus, such an under-
standing of international human rights would still not prevent
potentially grave abuses of the dignity of human life.
The ambiguity that would remain under such a reading can be best
understood by comments made by Austria during the drafting of Arti-
cle One of the CRC.  Austria noted that “ ‘[t]here is a possible inconsis-
tency between ‘the child’s right to adequate pre-natal care and the
possibilities for legal abortion provided in some countries.’”81  Addi-
tionally, Barbados posed the questions, “ ‘How far should [the child’s
right to life] go?  Does the child include the unborn child, or the foetus
[sic]?’”82  New Zealand asked similar questions, such as, “ ‘Does the
definition [of a child] begin at conception, at birth, or at some point in
79. Janoff, supra note 73, at 170 (quoting THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRE´PARTOIRES” 58 (Sharon De-
trick ed., 1992) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX PRE´PARTOIRES”]).
80. A ‘State Party’ is “a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for
which the treaty is in force.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties supra
note 75, art. 2(g); cf. id. art. 2(h) (defining “third state” as “a State not a party to
the treaty”).
81. Janoff, supra note 73, at 171 (quoting U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Sec-
retary-General, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1324 (1978), reprinted in GUIDE TO THE
“TRAVAUX PRE´PARTOIRES,” supra note 79, at 36, 61).
82. Id. (quoting U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, add. 4, U.N.
Doc E/CN.4/1324/Add.4 (1978), reprinted in GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX
PRE´PARTOIRES,” supra note 79, at 36, 83).
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between?’”83  Janoff suggests that the “silence on the controversial is-
sue of when childhood begins likely facilitated [the CRC’s] widespread
ratification, as the Red Cross predicted, since the laws of the states
parties incorporate vastly differing notions regarding the legal status
of the unborn.”84
As can be seen, at least under the CRC, the legal understanding of
when the right to life begins is fairly ambiguous.  Janoff concludes
that under the CRC it is unclear whether a child’s right to life “begins
at birth, at conception, or at some point in between.”85  She also ob-
serves that “[t]he international law that has emerged from the Con-
vention’s ambiguity might be used . . . to strike down laws restricting
the legality of and access to abortions . . . when abortion would protect
a girl’s life, health, or best interests.”86  In contrast to Janoff’s conclu-
sion, the ambiguity that remains may also cut the other way, namely,
that there is some play in the joints when issuing abortion legislation
which would permit for protection of the unborn child in the face of
ambiguity in international human rights law.
Another avenue for understanding the legal context of abortion is
examining the reports of the HRC under the ICCPR.  The reports of
the HRC from 1987 to 1998 on abortion were fairly sparse.  In 1987,
considerations regarding abortion pertained to the criminalization of
assisting and performing abortions.87  This was also the case in the
1988 report concerning Colombian laws which noted that Colombian
views on abortion were due to cultural traditions of Catholicism.88  A
1992 report on Austria noted that members of the HRC asked the
country “when it was planned to legalize abortions.”89  The same re-
port referred to Ecuador’s policy of prosecuting women for having
abortions.90  Also, it briefly stated its concerns with the “legality of
abortion” in Peru.91  In 1996, the HRC expressed concern with
Zambia’s high rate of maternal mortality resulting from abortion.92
83. Id. (quoting U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, add. 4, U.N.
Doc E/CN.4/1324/Add.4 (1978), reprinted in GUIDE TO THE “TRAVAUX
PRE´PARTOIRES,” supra note 79, at 36, 83).
84. Id. at 174–75.
85. Id. at 187.
86. Id. at 187–88.
87. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., 30–32, U.N. Doc. A/42/40; GAOR, 42d Sess.,
Supp No. 40 (Aug. 28, 1987).
88. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶ 523, U.N. Doc. A/43/40; GAOR, 43d Sess.,
Supp No. 40 (Sept. 28, 1988).
89. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶ 94, U.N. Doc. A/47/40; GAOR, 47th Sess.,
Supp No. 40 (Oct. 9, 1992).
90. Id. ¶ 234.
91. Id. ¶ 309.
92. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶ 195, U.N. Doc. A/51/40 (Vol. I); GAOR, 51st
Sess., Supp No. 40 (Apr. 13, 1997).
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The comments from 1999 to 2008 have been much more numerous,
with the exception of 2002, when no comments were made.  In a 1999
report, the HRC for the first time issued its recommendation on ma-
ternal death rates.  The HRC recommended to the Chilean govern-
ment that its “law be amended so as to introduce exceptions to the
general prohibition of all abortions and to protect the confidentiality of
medical information.”93  In the report on Lesotho, the HRC noted that
Lesotho made abortion illegal except where the woman is of unsound
mind or the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest.94  The Commit-
tee recommended that Lesotho “review the abortion law in order to
provide for situations where the life of the woman is in danger.”95  Re-
ferring to Costa Rica, the HRC also noted with concern “the conse-
quences for women of the continuing criminalization of all abortions,
including the danger to life involved in clandestine abortions.”96 The
Committee recommended that the law be “amended to introduce ex-
ceptions to the general prohibition of all abortion.”97  Reporting on Po-
land, the Committee noted concerns with “strict laws on abortion
which lead to high numbers of clandestine abortions with attendant
risks to the life and health of women.”98  The HRC stated that Poland
“should introduce policies and programmes promoting full and non-
discriminatory access to all methods of family planning.”99
A 2000 report concerning Morocco noted that the country’s strict
prohibition on abortion resulted in clandestine, unsafe abortions.100
The HRC urged Morocco to “ensure that women have full and equal
access to family planning services and to contraception.”101  The Com-
mittee also noted Ireland’s practice, which allowed for abortions when
the woman’s life was in danger, but not when the pregnancy was the
result of rape.102  Furthermore, the HRC noted with concern Kuwait’s
law, which made abortion a crime and contained no “exceptions on
humanitarian grounds.”103  Also, the Committee noted that “[s]tate
parties should give information on any measures taken by the State to
93. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶ 211, U.N. Doc. A/54/40 (Vol. I); GAOR, 54th
Sess., Supp No. 40 (Oct. 21, 1999) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1999 Human
Rights Committee Report].
94. Id. ¶ 254.
95. Id.
96. Id. ¶ 280.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. Id. ¶ 344.
100. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶ 100, U.N. Doc. A/55/40 (Vol. I); GAOR, 55th
Sess., Supp. No. 40 (Oct. 10, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 Human Rights Committee
Report].
101. Id.
102. Id. ¶ 444.
103. Id. ¶ 466.
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help women prevent unwanted pregnancies, and to ensure that they
do not have to undergo life-threatening clandestine abortions.”104
In 2001, the HRC reported that abortion practices in Trinidad and
Tobago should be reappraised and that risks that violate women’s
rights should be “removed from the law, by legislation if necessary
(arts. 3, 6.1 and 7).”105  The HRC also noted that in Argentina medical
professionals were deterred from providing abortion services when a
woman’s life was in danger or the pregnancy resulted from rape, be-
cause abortion is a crime in that country.106  The Committee recom-
mended that “in cases where abortion procedures may lawfully be
performed, all obstacles to obtaining them should be removed.”107 Re-
porting on Peru, the Committee stated its recurring concern that abor-
tion continues to be “subject to criminal penalties, even when
pregnancy is the result of rape.”108  The HRC also noted that such
provisions are “incompatible with articles 3, 6, and 7 of the Covenant
and recommend[ed] that the legislation should be amended to estab-
lish exceptions to the prohibition and punishment of abortion.”109
Pertaining to Venezuela, the HRC once again reported that exceptions
ought to be created to the “general prohibition of all non-therapeutic
abortion[s].”110
In 2003, the HRC noted the practice of clandestine abortions in
Mali as a violation of Article Six.111  The Committee recommended
that Mali “should help women avoid unwanted pregnancies, including
by strengthening its family planning and sex education programmes,
and ensure that they are not forced to undergo clandestine abortions,
which endanger their lives.”112
In 2004, the HRC reported its concern with Sri Lanka’s criminal-
ization of abortion except where it is performed to save the life of the
mother.113  It also noted its concern with “high number of abortions in
unsafe conditions, imperiling the life and health of the women con-
cerned, in violation of articles 6 and 7.”114  The HRC recommended
104. Id. at 134, ¶ 10.
105. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶ 72(18), U.N. Doc. A/56/40 (Vol. I); GAOR,
56th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (Oct. 26, 2001).
106. Id. ¶ 74(14).
107. Id.
108. Id. ¶ 76(20) (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Id. ¶ 77(19).
111. Rep. of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 81(14), U.N. Doc. A/58/40 (Vol. I), GAOR,
76th–78th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (Oct. 24, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Human Rights
Committee Report].
112. Id.
113. Rep. of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 66(12), U.N. Doc. A/59/40 (Vol. I), GAOR,
79th–81st Sess., Supp. No. 40 (Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Human Rights
Committee Report].
114. Id.
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that “the State party should ensure that women are not compelled to
continue with pregnancies, where this would be incompatible with ob-
ligations arising under the Covenant (article 7 and general comment
No. 28), and repeal the provisions criminalizing abortion.”115  It also
stated that, in Colombia, “legislation applicable to abortion [should be]
revised so that no criminal offences [sic] are involved in . . . cases in
which “women . . . have been victims of rape or incest or whose lives
are in danger.”116  In its report on Equatorial Guinea, the Committee
noted its “concern that legal restrictions on the availability of family
planning services give rise to high rates of pregnancy and illegal abor-
tion[s], which are one of the principal causes of maternal mortal-
ity.”117  The HRC recommended that Equatorial Guinea “do away
with the legal restrictions on family planning so as to reduce maternal
mortality (articles 23, 24 and 6 of the Covenant).”118
In 2005, the Committee made a remarkable statement about Alba-
nia.  It noted its concern with the “high rate of infant mortality and of
abortion and the apparent lack of family planning and social care in
some parts of the State party.”119  It recommended that “the State
party should take steps to ensure that abortion is not used as a
method of family planning and take appropriate measures to reduce
infant mortality.”120  The Committee also noted the criminalization of
abortion in Morocco.121  It recommended that Morocco “should ensure
that women are not forced to carry a pregnancy to full term where
that would be incompatible with its obligations under the Covenant
(arts. 6 and 7) and should relax the legislation relating to abortion.”122
In its report on Poland, the Committee was chiefly concerned with the
“unavailability of abortion in practice even when the law permits it,
for example in cases of pregnancy resulting from rape, and by the lack
of information on the use of the conscientious objection clause by med-
ical practitioners who refuse to carry out legal abortions.”123  The
Committee recommended that “[t]he State party . . . should provide
further information on the use of the conscientious objection clause by
doctors” as well as “liberalize its legislation.”124
115. Id.
116. Id. ¶ 67(13).
117. Id. ¶ 77(9).
118. Id.
119. Rep. of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 82(14), U.N. Doc. A/60/40 (Vol. I), GAOR,
82nd–84th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (Mar. 10, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Human Rights
Committee Report].
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id. ¶ 84(29).
122. Id.
123. Id. ¶ 85(8).
124. Id.
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In 2006, the HRC noted the restrictive laws in Paraguay, which
lead “women to seek unsafe, illegal abortions, at potential risk of their
life and health.”125  The recommendation was, as usual, the revision of
legislation concerning abortion to “bring it into line with the
Covenant.”126
In 2007, the HRC noted the practices of both Honduras and Mada-
gascar, where abortion was “especially [limited] in cases where the life
of the mother is in danger.”127  The recommendation was the usual
call for compatibility of abortion laws with the Covenant.128  The same
was said of Chile.129  Reporting on Zambia, the HRC was concerned
with the “requirement that three physicians must consent to an abor-
tion may constitute a significant obstacle for women wishing to un-
dergo legal and therefore safe abortion[s].”130
In 2008, the HRC pointed out its concern with Panamanian law,
which placed a limitation on access to abortion within the first two
months of pregnancy resulting from rape.131  The Committee recom-
mended that “the State party should amend its legislation so that it
effectively helps women avoid unwanted pregnancies and so that they
do not have to resort to illegal abortions that could endanger their
lives.”132
In its Complicacio´n de observaciones finales del Comite´ de Derechos
Humanos sobre paı´ses de Ame´rica Latina y el Caribe (1977–2004)
[Compilation of Final Observances of the Committee of Human Rights
concerning Latin American and Caribbean States (1977–2004)], the
HRC basically asserted the same types of concerns on abortion access
that were highlighted in other reports.133  However, there were a
couple interesting notations.  One was an inquiry why Mexico had
never considered abortion as a form of family planning.134 Also inter-
125. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶ 77(10), U.N. Doc. A/61/40 (Vol. I), GAOR,
85th–87th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (Jan. 1, 2006).
126. Id.
127. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶ 79(8), 84(14), U.N. Doc. A/62/40 (Vol. I),
GAOR, 88th–90th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (Jan. 11, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Human
Rights Committee Report].
128. Id.
129. Id. ¶ 84(8).
130. Id. ¶ 86(18).
131. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., ¶ 79(9), U.N. Doc. A/63/40 (Vol. I), GAOR,
91st–93d Sess., Supp. No. 40 (Jan. 10, 2008).
132. Id.
133. OFICINA DEL ALTO COMISIONADO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LAS DERECHOS
HUMANOS REPRESENTACIO´N REGIONAL PARA AME´RICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE, COMPI-
LACIO´N DE OBSERVACIONES FINALES DEL COMITE´ DE DERECHOS HUMANOS SOBRE
PAI´SES DE AME´RICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE (1977–2004) 55–56, 64, 75, 81, 87, 99, 106,
107, 162, 169, 196–97, 213, 217, 227, 248, 298, 327–28, 363, 411, 431, 433, 438,
442–43, 492, 495, 515–16, 541 (translation by author), available at http://www2.
ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/publications/HRC-Compilacion(1977-2004).pdf.
134. Id. at 363.
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esting was the Committee’s noted awareness of Uruguay’s policy that
“not all abortions are considered of the same criminal degree and
there exists different gradations of punishment for the respective
crime.”135
Although the above excerpts of various HRC reports merely frame
in general terms the state of abortion in international human rights
law, certain key elements can be extrapolated from these reports.
First, there seems to be an emphasis on making “exceptions” to gen-
eral prohibitions of abortion laws.  These exceptions are to be carved
out for circumstances where the mother’s life or health is in danger
and when the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest.  These excep-
tions seem to indicate that the general rule is that parties to the Con-
vention may protect  human life from conception.  Additionally, it is
arguable whether these exceptions would rise to the level of custom-
ary international law, which is binding.136  In order for that to occur,
two elements would be necessary.  First, there would need to be a uni-
form state practice.137  Second, there would need to be a sense of legal
obligation (otherwise known as opinio juris).138  The excessive encour-
agement by the HRC that countries make exceptions to their general
prohibition of abortion could create the occasion for finding not only
uniform state practice of exceptions to general prohibitions of abor-
tion, but it could also create the impression that a country is under a
legal obligation (opinio juris) to create legal exceptions to a general
prohibition on abortion.139  In addition, because it is not necessary
that every state participate in the uniform state practice for it to rise
to the level of customary international law, the requirement that a
state have exceptions to general abortion prohibitions could still be
135. Id. at 516 (translation by author).
136. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 701(b).
137. Id. §102(2); see also Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Ap-
proaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L.
757, 757 (2001) (“State practice refers to general and consistent practice by
states”).
138. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, at § 102; see also Roberts, supra note 137, at 757
(“[O]pinio juris means that the practice is followed out of a belief of legal
obligation.”)
139. See also Roberts, supra note 137, at 758 (stating that the modern trend tends to
focus on opinio juris more than uniform state practice).
[M]odern custom is derived by a deductive process that begins with gen-
eral statements of rules rather than particular instances of practice.
This approach emphasizes opinio juris rather than state practice be-
cause it relies on statements rather than actions.  Modern custom can
develop quickly because it is deduced from multilateral treaties and dec-
larations by international for a such as the General Assembly, which can
declare exciting customs, crystallize emerging customs, and generate
new customs.
Id.
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applied erga omnes.140  Nonetheless, most of the exceptions to general
prohibitions on abortion for which the HRC calls probably do not im-
pose any actual legal obligations (opinio juris), so they do not rise to
the level of customary international law.  The HRC repeatedly dis-
courages and somewhat castigates the countries for their restrictive
laws on abortion, but it is not altogether conclusive that this has any
legal binding force on these countries.141  Nonetheless, the existence
of this “exceptions-talk” provides an avenue for states to continue pro-
tecting human life from conception, with a few exceptions.
Second, two distinct shifts can be identified in the language that is
used by the HRC throughout the years.  The first shift occurs in the
HRC’s reports from 1999 and 2000.  In these reports, abortion begins
to be discussed alongside family planning programs and increased ac-
cessibility to contraception.142  However, the HRC refrains from stat-
ing whether such family planning programs and accessibility to
contraception involve greater access to abortion.143  This problem is
potentially alleviated in light of the 2005 recommendation to Albania
that abortion should never be used as a family planning method.144
The second shift occurs in 2003 and 2004, where language discussing
liberalization of abortion policies becomes much stronger, yet highly
ambiguous.  For example, the Committee uses such language in the
contexts of helping pregnant women avoid “unwanted pregnancies”145
or advising that States Parties must revise laws because they are “in-
compatible with obligations arising under the Covenant” (usually in
140. OPPENHEIM, L., 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992), reprinted in HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 168 (2007) “Rights and obligations erga omnes may
even be created by the actions of a limited number of states.”).  “Erga omnes”
means valid against all states, whether they consent to be bound by it or not. IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW xli (6th ed. 2003); see also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 703 cmt. b (“Since the obligations of the custom-
ary law of human rights are erga omnes (obligations to all states), . . . any state
may pursue remedies for their violation . . . .”); id. § 902 cmt. a (“Thus, any state
may . . . pursue a remedy for a denial of human rights in violation of customary
international law . . . .”).
141. Roberts, supra note 137, at 758 (“Whether [a text] become[s] custom depends on
factors such as whether they are phrased in declaratory terms, supported by a
widespread and representative body of states, and confirmed by state practice.”);
see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 701 reporters’ notes 1 (1987) (“There is a
disposition to find legal obligation in indeterminate language about human rights
in international agreements.”).
142. 1999 Human Rights Committee Report, supra note 93, ¶ 211; 2000 Human
Rights Committee Report, supra note 100, ¶ 100.
143. 1999 Human Rights Committee Report, supra note 93, ¶ 211; 2000 Human
Rights Committee Report, supra note 100, ¶ 344.
144. 2005 Human Rights Committee Report, supra note 119, ¶ 82(14).
145. 2003 Human Rights Committee Report, supra note 111, ¶ 81(14); 2004 Human
Rights Committee Report, supra note 113, ¶ 66(12).
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reference to Articles Six and Seven).146  However, this type of lan-
guage does not offer any definitive guidance.  If compatibility with Ar-
ticles Six and Seven requires a state to allow abortion in certain
circumstances—namely, when the mother’s life or health is in danger
and when conception is the result of rape or incest—then it seems that
the Committee recommendations are fairly narrow.  On the other
hand, if the nebulous language of the HRC is intended to broaden the
scope of abortion rights, then the use of such ambiguous language
could potentially do what it is intended to do by providing avenues of
textual support for those who advocate an unfettered access to
abortion.
Additionally, there is discontinuity between the HRC’s various rec-
ommendations and General Comment Twenty-Eight.  For example,
one of the Committee Reports from 2004 recommends that “[t]he State
party should ensure that women are not compelled to continue with
pregnancies, where this would be incompatible with obligations aris-
ing under the Covenant.”147  General Comment Twenty-Eight states
that “State parties should give information on any measures taken by
the State to help women prevent unwanted pregnancies, and to en-
sure that they do not have to undergo life-threatening clandestine
abortions.”148  Once again, if “unwanted pregnancies” is meant to re-
fer to those that arise from rape and incest, then there seems to be
consistent application of the HRC’s recommendations in various re-
ports.  However, if this term is meant to have a more liberal applica-
tion, then it can be argued that there exists some greater right to
abortion than has previously been warranted by the exceptions.  This
ambiguity is a disservice to both sides of the issue, but it is particu-
larly problematic for those who advocate legislation that protects
human life from conception, since the language can be construed
broadly to provide for a potential human right in the unfettered access
and right to abortion.
Finally, the Committee Reports contain conclusions that are made
without any foundation or support—in other words, they are asser-
tions to be blindly accepted.  For example, in a 2007 Committee Report
it was implied that if abortion is legal, it is therefore safe.149  This
claim amounts to an unwarranted axiomatic truth claim.  Just be-
cause abortion is legal, it is not necessarily safe.  In fact, abortions—
even if they are safe—may still have a detrimental effect on the wo-
146. 2003 Human Rights Committee Report, supra note 111, ¶ 81(14); 2004 Human
Rights Committee Report, supra note 113, ¶ 66(12).
147. See 2004 Human Rights Committee Report, supra note 113, ¶ 66(12).
148. See 2000 Human Rights Committee Report, supra note 100, 134, ¶ 10.
149. 2007 Human Rights Committee Report, supra note 127, ¶¶ 79(8), 84(14).
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man’s physical, mental, and even spiritual well-being.150  Though rea-
sonable minds could differ on this conclusion, the HRC seems to adopt
a “legal, therefore safe” view as a type of axiom.
3. Unfettered Access to Abortion
The understanding that international human rights law provides
an unfettered access to abortion is based on a number of human rights
provisions requiring a mother to have a free license to seek an abor-
tion at any time she desires whether it is because of health interests
or it is purely a personal request based on self-interests.151
Professor Richard Wilkins sees this evolutionary process of the un-
fettered right to abortion as a product of the rapid change of “soft law”
into “hard law.”152  Wilkins states that the “modern UN system
churns out soft law norms at an ever-increasing rate.”153  This soft
law can come in the form of various UN meetings or documents (for
example, the Committee Reports that were analyzed above).154  Wil-
kins notes that every year the UN examines questions on “virtually
every conceivable social issue.”155  “As a result . . . various reports,
platforms, agendas, and declarations are issued, updated, and ex-
panded.”156  He further states, “Not long ago, these soft law docu-
ments were considered little more than helpful—or, perhaps, even
irrelevant—suggestions.  Today, they are more than mere words.”157
In fact, many of these soft law norms “generated at UN meetings
can rapidly attain a status approximating hard law.”158  Wilkins
states that this transformation occurs because various national gov-
ernments, non-governmental organizations, and legal scholars attach
great importance to these soft law norms.159  He also points out:
150. See New Study Affirms Link Between Abortion and Mental Health Problems,
POST-ABORTION REV. (Elliot Inst., Springfield, Ill.), Spring 2010, at 3, available at
http://www.afterabortion.org/PAR/v17/v17n1.pdf; Physical Effects of Abortion,
ABORTIONRISKS.ORG, http://www.abortionrisks.org/index.php?title=physical_
Effects_of_Abortion (last visited Feb. 25, 2011); Rachel’s Vineyard – About Us,
RACHELSVINEYARD.ORG, http://www.rachelsvineyard.org/aboutus/ourstory.htm
(last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
151. Zampas & Gher, supra note 1, at 287 (“The right to voluntary motherhood and
thus the right to decide to obtain an abortion is arguably integral to a constella-
tion of other fundamental human rights such as women’s right to equality, life,
health, security of person, private and family life, freedom of religion, conscience
and opinion, and freedom from slavery, torture and cruel, and inhuman and/or
degrading treatment.”); see Wilkins & Reynolds, supra note 46, at 143–45.
152. Wilkins & Reynolds, supra note 46, at 128–31.
153. Id. at 128.
154. See supra notes 87–132.
155. Wilkins & Reynolds, supra note 46, at 128
156. Id. at 128–29.
157. Id. at 129.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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At one time, customary law was formed over the course of centuries because
such law was developed through the uniform, consistent practice of nations
over time.  More recently, and largely because of the exploding number of in-
ternational meetings, some legal scholars argue that binding international
norms develop—at least in significant part—through the mere repetition of
agreed language at UN conferences.160
The speed at which these documents come out and the absence of re-
sponses on the part of many countries may be enough for some of
these soft laws to gain the momentum to be posited as hard law.161
Wilkins states that, because of these factors, namely, “the growing
reach of international treaties, the explosive growth of international
soft law norms, and the willingness of judges and others to enforce
international pronouncements,” those who are interested in protecting
human life from conception must pay particular attention not only to
the development of national law, but also to “international treaties,
UN conference declarations, and the opinions of jurists from [other]
legal systems.”162  For example, it is argued that the General Com-
ments have “evolved into a type of quasi-judicial instrument in which
the Committee spells out its interpretation of different provisions of
the Covenant.”163  These “Comments are relied upon by the Commit-
tee in evaluating compliance by States with their obligations under
the Covenant.”164  In other words, the General Comments have a po-
tential binding effect on States Parties.  In this regard, it is of utmost
importance for legal scholars interested in the protection of human life
from conception to pay particular attention to these malleable soft law
norms.
Wilkins, speaking from personal experience, finds that those who
argue for unfettered access to abortion do so, at least initially, in a
covert fashion.165  He states that these diplomats and scholars rarely
use the term “abortion” to advocate for this right.166  Rather, they pro-
mote the unfettered access to abortion under the guise of providing
the “full range of reproductive health care services,” claiming that
such access is “the necessary lynchpin for environmental preservation,
empowerment of women, access to health care, elimination of gender-
based violence, and the promotion of human dignity.”167  He argues
that they also use “ambiguous and potentially expansive terms” to
broaden the horizon for access to this so-called right to abortion.168
However, he also states that, at least to date, such language has not
160. Id. at 130–31.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 133.
163. BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 3, at 55.
164. Id.
165. Wilkins & Reynolds, supra note 46, at 142, 146.
166. Id. at 146.
167. Id. at 145.
168. Id. at 149.
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“expressly and unequivocally recognize[d] an international right to
abortion.”169  Nonetheless, “the impact that the broad wording of . . .
[a document] might have on the unborn life is unknown.”170
Unfettered access to abortion might be most easily refuted by Arti-
cle Eighteen of the ICCPR, which states that “[e]veryone shall have
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right
shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice or teaching.”171  In other words, those doctors or
medical practitioners who would wish not to participate or assist in an
abortion would be able to refuse based on conscience.  There is one
limitation to this, however, under section three of Article Eighteen of
the ICCPR, which states, “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or be-
liefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law
and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”172
Professor Bernard Dickens states that such conscientious objec-
tions should be read narrowly so as to protect the patient, noting that
some legislation “protects religious, moral, or ethical preferences” at
the cost of depriving patients of their “reproductive and other rights,
and often empowers health service providers and institutions in effect
to impose their will at patients’ cost, including the cost their
health.”173  However much this statement may be true within the
realm of current international human rights law, great ambiguity still
exists as to what constitutes a “fundamental right” or “freedom of
others” under the ICCPR.  In other words, there still exists that ques-
tion of the hierarchy of rights: do certain rights (i.e., freedom of con-
science and religion) trump other rights (i.e., so-called right to
abortion)?  Under current law, as has been previously analyzed, it is
clear that the only possible exceptions to complying with the Covenant
are when the mother’s life or health is in danger or the pregnancy is
the result of rape or incest.  Outside of this context, it is unclear
whether conscientious objections by doctors or medical practitioners
would not prevail over other so-called unfettered rights to abortion
that have not been defined clearly by the international human rights
system.
169. Id. at 149.
170. Id. at 157.
171. International Covenant, supra note 21, art. 18(1).
172. Id. art. 18(3).
173. Bernard M. Dickens, Legal Protections and Limits of Conscientious Objection:
When Conscientious Objection is Unethical, 28 MED. & L. 337, 340 (2009).
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C. Regional Systems of Human Rights
1. European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) became effec-
tive on September 3, 1953.174  Its Member States are limited to those
who have already become “parties to the European Convention.”175
As stated earlier, the ECHR does not provide for an explicit protection
of life from conception, much like the UDHR.  In fact, the mission and
goal of the ECHR is to carry out the enforcement of the UDHR.176
The ECHR created two institutions to carry out its mission: the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of
Human Rights (European Court).177  The European system’s outlook
on abortion is best enshrined in a case entitled Tysiac v. Poland,
which the European Court decided in 2007.178
In its decision, the European Court began its assessment by noting
that it was not the “Court’s task in the present case to examine
whether the Convention guarantees a right to have an abortion.”179
This reading avoided any requirement to interpret the Convention’s
right to life provision.  Instead, the European Court focused on Article
Eight’s provision concerning privacy.180  The European Court stated
that the “essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual
against arbitrary interference by public authorities.”181  The Euro-
pean Court noted that a state’s regulation on abortion “relate[s] to the
traditional balancing of privacy and public interests.”182  However, in
the case of a therapeutic abortion, the European Court insisted that
“the positive obligations of the State to secure the physical integrity of
the mothers-to-be” must also be balanced.183  In this case, the Euro-
pean Court found that the State’s refusal to allow an abortion
“amounted to an interference with [the mother’s] rights guaranteed by
Article 8.”184  However, it should be noted, once again, the primary
concern of European Court was with Article Eight and the denial of
rights incident thereto that could have led to “possible negative conse-
quences of [the mother’s] pregnancy and upcoming delivery for her
174. BUERGENTHAL ET AL., supra note 3, at 136.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 139.
177. Id. at 140.




179. Id. ¶ 104.
180. Id. ¶ 106.
181. Id. ¶ 109.
182. Id. ¶ 107.
183. Id.
184. Id. ¶ 108.
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health.”185  Thus, on the one hand, it could be argued that the right to
abortion was not at the forefront of this case, since arguably central to
the European Court’s holding was the health of the mother.  On the
other hand, abortion was certainly the pivotal issue of the case and,
construed broadly, this case could be interpreted as promoting a right
to abortion.
Interestingly, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Borrego stated that
“[a]ccording to [the majority’s] reasoning, there is a Polish child, cur-
rently six years old, whose right to be born contradicts the Conven-
tion.”186  Judge Borrego’s outlook on the case proposes a mind-
boggling dilemma.  It could be said that the reasoning of the majority,
taken to its logical conclusion, ultimately has to affirm the statement
by Judge Borrego.  If a mother should not have been inhibited from
having an abortion, then it follows that the unborn child never had a
legitimate right to be born.  Overall, this case portrays well the issue
of abortion in the international legal setting.
2. Organization of American States
The Organization of American States (OAS) came into existence
when its charter was adopted in 1948, but the OAS has roots dating
back to 1889.187  The OAS currently contains thirty-five Member
States and has granted Permanent Observer status to over sixty-three
states, along with the European Union.188
In 1969, the OAS adopted the American Convention on Human
Rights.189  Article Four of this document states, “Every person has the
right to have his life respected.  This right shall be protected by law
and, in general, from the moment of conception.  No one shall be arbi-
trarily deprived of his life.”190  On its face, this provision generally
outlines a “right to life.”
However, it was not until 1981 that the Inter-American Commis-
sion ruled on the scope of the “right to life” provision.191  The ruling
pertained to a denunciation by various groups of the United States on
the basis that its abortion laws were “incompatible with U.S. human
rights obligations as a member of the Organization of American
States.”192  The Commission predominantly ruled on the scope of Arti-
185. Id. ¶ 124.
186. Id. ¶ 15 (Borrego, J., dissenting).
187. Who We Are, ORG. OF AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp
(last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
188. See id.
189. Our History, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, http://www.oas.org/en/about/
our_history.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
190. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 9, art. 4(1).
191. Brian J. Leslie, Poland, Abortion, and the Roman Catholic Church, 17 B.C. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 453, 471 (1994).
192. Id.
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cle Four of the American Convention on Human Rights through Arti-
cle One of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man.193  The Commission ultimately decided that the United States’
abortion laws did not violate the United States’ obligation under the
American Declaration.194  It did not specifically rule on the American
Convention on Human Rights because the United States was not a
party to it.195  The Commission stated that the right to life did not
extend to a fetus “partially because a number of U.S. states allowed
abortion rights at the time the American Declaration was drafted.”196
In the Inter-American Commission’s discussion of Article Four, it
also “concluded that the provision protecting life from conception”
was, in essence, “a compromise between pro- and anti-abortion fac-
tions.”197  However, it is somewhat difficult to comprehend how an ex-
plicit right to protection of life from conception can in any way be
equivalent to a compromise between factions.  The Commission also
stated that protecting life from “conception, or at any time [before] . . .
birth” was to be a determination of domestic law.198  This argument,
as opposed to the compromise argument, makes more sense, especially
in light of the reservation made by Mexico, at the time of its ratifica-
tion, that the first paragraph of Article Four “does not constitute an
obligation to adopt, or keep in force, legislation to protect life ‘from the
moment of conception,’ since this matter falls within the domain re-
served to the States.”199
Overall, it interesting that the only human rights document that
purports to protect life from conception, in theory, does not actually do
so as a practical matter.  Rather, the Commission delegates Article
Four’s interpretation to the individual nations.
193. Id. “Every human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his per-
son.” Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man art. 1, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX, available at http://www1.
umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas2dec.htm.
194. Leslie, supra note 191, at 471.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Leslie, supra note 191, at 471–72.
198. Id. at 472.
199. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Decla-
rations/Reservations/Denunciations/Withdrawals, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No.
36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-32.
html#Mexico.
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III. ABORTION: HOLY SEE INTERVENTION
A. Overview of Catholic Teaching on Abortion
A simple overview of the Catechism of the Catholic Church
(CCC)200 provides the necessary groundwork for understanding the
Church’s human rights position concerning the right to life.  In its
opening words about abortion, CCC paragraph 2270 states, “Human
life must be respected and protected absolutely from the moment of
conception.  From the moment of conception, a human being must be
recognized as having the rights of a person—among which is the invio-
lable right of every innocent being to life.”201  One of the earliest writ-
ten proclamations of this teaching for the Catholic Church exists in
the Didache, which was written in approximately A.D. 140.202  This
early teaching document stated that “you shall not procure abortion,
nor destroy a new-born child.”203  The CCC states that this “teaching
has not changed and remains unchangeable.”204  Furthermore, CCC
paragraph 2273 states that an “inalienable right to life of every inno-
cent human individual is a constitutive element of a civil society and
its legislation.”205  Citing another ecclesiastical document, Donum Vi-
tae (meaning the “Gift of Life”), issued in 1987, CCC paragraph 2273
states that the human right to life from conception “depend[s] neither
on a single individual . . . nor on parents; nor do they represent a con-
cession made by society and the state; they belong to human nature
and are inherent in the person by virtue of the creative act from which
the person took his origin.”206  In this sense, the language of the
UDHR Preamble closely resembles that of the Catholic Church.  Fur-
thermore, Donum Vitae emphasizes a point that is at the center of all
Catholic social teaching, namely, that people have inherent dignity be-
cause God creates them in God’s image (imago Dei).207  Finally, it is
200. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (1995), available at http://www.vatican.
va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM.
201. Id. ¶ 2270.
202. 1 FAITH OF THE EARLY FATHERS 2 (W.A. Jurgens ed. & trans., 1970).
203. Id.
204. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 200, ¶ 227.
205. Id.
206. Id. ¶ 2273.
207. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Donum Vitae [Instruction on Respect
for Human Life and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of
the Day] (1987), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/docu
ments/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html (“From the
moment of conception, the life of every human being is to be respected in an abso-
lute way because man is the only creature on earth that God has ‘wished for
himself’ and the spiritual soul of each man is ‘immediately created’ by God; his
whole being bears the image of the Creator.  Human life is sacred because from
its beginning it involves ‘the creative action of God’ and it remains forever in a
special relationship with [the] Creator, who is its sole end.” (internal citations
omitted)).
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worth noting that the Church teaches that the law should provide pe-
nal sanctions for “every deliberate violation of the child’s rights.”208
B. Roman Catholic Involvement in Human Rights
1. Historical Development
Professor William Wagner argues that “[o]n the level of theory, the
concept of human rights also enjoys a demonstrable relationship with
Catholicism, viewed as a tradition of intellectual and moral reflec-
tion.”209  He further states that from its earliest days, “[t]he Church
championed the rescue of abandoned infants, prostitutes, and
slaves . . . .  Catholic clergy officiated at marriages between slaves and
free individuals in violation of state prohibition.”210 Wagner also notes
that international law and human rights have their roots in early ca-
non law, particularly that developed by St. Augustine and St. Thomas
Aquinas.211  Wagner further links the influence of three particular
clergymen—Francisco Sua´rez, Francisco de Vittoria, and Bartolome´
de las Casas—with contemporary international law and human
rights.212
Wagner points out briefly the role each clergyman played in inter-
national law and human rights development.213  In particular, Sua´rez
“advanced the cause of international law by his insight into the posi-
tive character of international-law norms” and also through the role
he played in “argu[ing] for natural rights of life, liberty, and prop-
erty.”214  De Vittoria “defended the rights of indigenous people to
property, self-rule, and free consent in the choice of religion.”215  His
voice on this matter was one of great moral authority in a time when
Native Americans were facing grave violations of human rights by
those who had arrived in the New World.216  Similarly, de las Casas
advocated on behalf of indigenous people of the Caribbean in front of
the Spanish Crown.217  Although he ultimately lost on the issue of
208. Id.
209. William J. Wagner, Catholicism, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA ON HUMAN RIGHTS 260, 263
(David Forsythe ed., 2009).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 264–65.




216. See Ernest Nys, Introduction to FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA, THE CLASSICS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: DE INDIS ET DE JURE BELLI RELECTIONES BEING PARTS OF RELEC-
TIONES THEOLOGICAE XII 66, 85–91, 100 (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bate
trans., Oceana Publ’ns 1964) (1557).
217. Id.
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slavery, his stance had a great influence on the development of human
rights.218
Within this historical context, Wagner states that the Church has
been an “undeniable force in the historical dialectic by which human
rights came, over time, to be acknowledged.”219  Furthermore, the
Church’s “original witness in favor of the dignity of the per-
son . . . must be considered elements helping to explain subsequent
progress with respect to human rights under Western institutions.”220
However, amidst all the positive influences the Church has had, it
has not been afraid to acknowledge its failures, both within the histor-
ical context and contemporaneously.  Wagner points to a speech of
Pope John Paul II, on March 12, 2000, in which he called “for repen-
tance by Catholics for the sins of the Catholic Church against human
rights, specifically against ‘the service of truth,’ ‘members of other
Christian denominations,’ ‘the people of Israel,’ ‘the peoples of other
cultures and religions,’ ‘the dignity of women,’ and ‘the fundamental
rights of the person.’”221  Additionally, Wagner states that “[s]uch a
critique must itself be tempered by awareness of the polemical influ-
ence on popular impressions of counter religious, political, and intel-
lectual movements, which are themselves no less fair game for moral
critique.”222  He also highlights a master theologian of the Church,
Hans Ur von Balthasar, who pointed to the “unparalleled ‘weight of
history’ that rests upon the Catholic Church with its unequaled con-
tinuity, ensuring that it alone among contemporary institutions must
account for practices that were once contemporaneous with institu-
tions that vanished a millennium ago.”223
Another significant point for the Catholic Church has been the
Church’s involvement in formation of modern international human
rights.  Professor Robert John Araujo, of the Society of Jesus, notes
that although the Holy See did not become a Permanent Observer of
the United Nations until 1964, “its role and participation in the work
of this international organization began shortly after the United Na-
tions was founded in 1945.”224  He notes that initially the UN was
intended to limit itself to larger states, whereby the Holy See could
not enter into the organization.225  Nonetheless, the “Holy See was
invited to participate in UN activities shortly thereafter.”226  The Holy
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 266.
221. Id. at 268.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Robert John Araujo, The International Personality and Sovereignty of the Holy
See, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 291, 346 (2001).
225. Id.
226. Id.
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See became a Permanent Observer in 1964 and has had extensive par-
ticipation in UN activities.227
One last important point of Catholic influence within the human
rights context is the prominent role that Jacques Maritain, a Catholic
and French philosopher, played in the early development of the UN
and the UDHR.  Maritain’s main objective, in his role of helping shape
and draft the UDHR, was to make the document one of universal ap-
plicability.228  Maritain’s answer to universal applicability was the no-
tion that people can agree on practical conclusions while disagreeing
on the theoretical means for justifying those conclusions.229
Renato Raffaele Cardinal Martino, Permanent Observer of the
Holy See to the United Nations from 1986 to 2002, states that the
work of Maritain can help with understanding the nature of human
rights and the UDHR.230  Cardinal Martino begins by emphasizing
Maritain’s principle that the creation of such a universally applicable
document as the UDHR had to sacrifice the investigation of indepen-
dent philosophical notions in attaining general principles.231  In Mari-
tain’s own words, the agreement was possible “on the condition that
no one asks . . . why?”232  Rather than attempt to agree on “philosophi-
cal principles or speculative ideals,” it was more important to “achieve
a consensus on common practical ideals that would apply to all.”233
Furthermore, Maritain saw two differing schools of thought when
it came to fundamental human rights.  First, human beings have “cer-
tain fundamental and inalienable rights antecedent in nature, and su-
perior to society.”234  Second, “rights are relative to the historical
development of society, and are themselves constantly variable and in
the state of flux.”235  Cardinal Martino notes that although this might
have been the case as to different philosophical notions of the exis-
tence of rights, this did not deter Maritain from “presenting his own
227. Id. at 347–53.
228. Bradley R. Munro, Maritain and the Universality of Human Rights, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL THEORY AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 109,
121–24 (William Sweet ed., 2003).
229. Id. at 122 (“In the domain of practical assertion . . . an agreement on a common
declaration is possible by means of an approach that is more pragmatic than the-
oretical, and by a collective effort of comparing, recasting, and perfecting the
drafts in order to make them acceptable to all as points of practical convergence,
regardless of the divergence in theoretical perspectives.” (internal citation
omitted)).
230. Renato Raffaele Cardinal Martino, John Paul II and the International Order:
Human Rights and the Nature of the Human Person, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 51, 57 (2007).
231. Id. at 58.
232. Id. (quoting Jacques Maritain, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND
INTERPRETATIONS 9 (UNESCO ed., 1949).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 59.
235. Id. at 58–59.
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views that strongly reflected a Christian perspective on fundamental
rights.”236  Additionally, Maritain recognized the “positive contribu-
tion of the diversity of views about human rights.”237  However, be-
cause of this diversity, Maritain recognized that “humanity should not
expect too much from the Declaration.”238
Overall, Maritain was able to recognize the diversity of views with-
out changing his own views on rights—views that were deeply seated
in the natural law tradition of St. Thomas Aquinas.  Maritain was con-
cerned with views that over-emphasized the rights of the individ-
ual.239  This type of rights-talk would inevitably place human rights
“outside the social and relationship context which was so essential so
that ‘universal norms of right and duty’ could be properly understood
and practiced.”240  Liberty was not to be severed from the common
good.241
2. Current Involvement
Every Pope since the inception of the United Nations has lauded
the efforts of an international human rights regime and has urged
protecting the rights most fundamental to human life, including life
itself.242  Perhaps one of the clearest and authoritative ecclesial state-
ments comes from the Dignitatis Humanae (Dignity of the Human
Person) of the Second Vatican Council: “the council intends to develop
the doctrine of recent popes on the inviolable rights of the human per-
son and the constitutional order of society.”243  However rich and in-
sightful these authoritative texts of the Church may be, they are more
completely understood in their actual application.  Thus, the interven-
tions of the Holy See by the Permanent Observers to the UN will be
the focus of this subsection.
236. Id. at 59.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 60.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 59–60.
242. See generally Wagner, supra note 210, at 260–63 (“Pope John XXIII expressly
endorsed both the creation of the United Nations and the promulgation of its
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as major moral milestones for the human
race.  Subsequent Popes—Paul VI, John Paul II, and Benedict XVI—have voiced,
in addresses before the United Nations General Assembly and elsewhere, their
fundamental affirmation both of the United Nations and the international frame-
work of human rights centering on the Universal Declaration. . . .  In keeping
with its philosophical and theological commitments, the Vatican promotes a vi-
sion of human rights, including within their scope respect for the human being in
all stages of development, from conception to a natural death.”).
243. 1 SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, Dignitatis Humanae, in VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE
CONCILIAR AND POST-CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 799, 800 (Austin Flannery, O.P., ed.,
new rev. ed. 2004), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_
vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html.
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A search of the interventions by the Holy See yields no explicit ref-
erences to abortion.  Rather, language pertaining to abortion would
have to be implied from other general statements, with the exception
of a few explicit statements.  Nevertheless, the language used by the
Holy See in most of these interventions leaves little room for ambigu-
ity on its stance pertaining to issues of human life.
The Holy See has stated that “[a]mong the fundamental rights, or
rather foremost among them, as the Universal Declaration explicitly
states, is the right to life of every individual.”244  In another prime
example of its understanding and position on human rights, the Holy
See has further stated:
The recognition of the existence of fundamental human rights necessarily pre-
supposes a universal and transcendent truth about man that is not only prior
to all human activity, but also determines it . . . .  Respect for the right to life
at every stage, from conception to natural death, firmly establishes the princi-
ple that life is not at anyone’s disposal.245
The Holy See has also communicated its stance concerning health and
women: “The Holy See continues to advocate a holistic approach to the
health of women which does not exclusively focus on a single aspect of
a woman but on her overall and comprehensive health care needs.”246
However, the Holy See’s language has not always been pleasant.  It
has, at times, been hostile, especially in its criticisms toward the UN
pointing out the contradiction between the rights that are to be pro-
tected and the way the UN attempts to interpret and protect those
rights:
[T]he Holy See understands access to reproductive health as being a holistic
concept that does not consider abortion or access to abortion as a dimension of
those terms. . . .  It is surely tragic that . . . the same Convention created to
protect persons with disabilities from all discrimination in the exercise of
their rights, may be used to deny the very basic right to life of disabled unborn
persons.247
244. H.E. Archbishop Giovanni Lajolo, Secretary for the Holy See’s Relations with
States, Address at the General Debate of the 59th Session of the UN General
Assembly (Sept. 29, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/59/state
ments/holeng040929.pdf.
245. H.E. Archbishop Celestino Migliore, Permanent Observer of the Holy See, State-
ment at the 62nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Oct. 30,
2007), available at http://www.holyseemission.org/30Oct2007%20Culture%20of%
20Peace.html.
246. H.E. Archbishop Celestino Migliore, Permanent Observer of the Holy See, State-
ment before the Third Committee of the 60th Session of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly on Agenda Item 65: Implementation of the Outcome of the Fourth
World Conference on Women and the Special Session of the General Assembly
Entitled “Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace in the Twenty-
First Century” (Oct. 13, 2005), available at http://www.holyseemission.org/13Oct
2005%20Women.html.
247. H.E. Archbishop Celestino Migliore, Permanent Observer of the Holy See, State-
ment before the 61st Session of the UN General Assembly, 76th Plenary Meeting,
on Item 67(b): Human Rights Questions, Including Alternative Approaches for
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In addition, the Holy See has recognized the great responsibility of the
UN in capturing the true meaning of the human rights it seeks to pro-
tect: “The United Nations will be appreciated in its own right when-
ever the rule of law is translated from discussion of norms and values
into tangible results for those who seek justice.”248  This responsibility
also extends to every person: “Protecting rights means, therefore, to
respect ethical imperatives that are the necessary precondition for
freedom. . . .  Human rights, in fact, are not a rhetorical remembrance,
but the result of the responsible deeds of everyone.”249
Also, the Holy See has intervened by stating its teleological vision
on man and the way in which the goal of human rights might be
fulfilled:
The rights to life and freedom of thought, conscience and religion remain the
core of the human rights system. . . . Only by respecting the right to life, from
the moment of conception until natural death, and the consciences of all be-
lievers, will we promote a world cognizant and respectful of a deeper sense of
meaning and purpose.250
C. What Can the Holy See Offer Human Rights Discourse in
the Future?
The one thing the Church cannot do is remain silent: justice de-
mands that the Church let its voice be heard.  In fact, the interna-
tional dialogue of human rights calls for a plurality of voices.  This
plurality is not a sacrifice of the truth or the common good, but rather
is a catalyst to attaining that common good which subsists and relies
on the truth.  Considering the current state of international human
rights law on the issue of abortion, this Comment concludes with four
approaches that the Holy See would benefit from in its continual at-
tempts at establishing a human rights system that recognizes the
Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms: Note by the Secretary-General Transmitting the Final Report of the Ad
Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on
the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabili-
ties (A/61/611): Draft Resolution (para. 7) (Dec. 13, 2006), available at http://
www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=155#holysee.
248. H.E. Archbishop Celestino Migliore, Permanent Observer of the Holy See, State-
ment at the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Before the
Sixth Committee on Item 79: The Rule of Law at the National and International
Levels (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www.holyseemission.org/13Oct2008.
html.
249. H.E. Archbishop Celestino Migliore, Permanent Observer of the Holy See, State-
ment before the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Commem-
oration of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Declaration of Human Right (Dec. 10,
2008), available at http://www.holyseemission.org/10Dec2008.html.
250. H.E. Archbishop Celestino Migliore, Permanent Observer of the Holy See, State-
ment before the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Agenda
Item 100: Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization (Oct.
6, 2008), available at http://www.holyseemission.org/06Oct2008.html.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\89-4DR\NEB406.txt unknown Seq: 35 21-JUL-11 15:42
1166 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1132
right to life from conception.  First, the Holy See should promote a call
for legal scholarship on the topic of the right to life from conception.
Second, the Holy See should continue to promote true religious free-
dom over merely religious tolerance.  Additionally, the Holy See must
maintain its tenacious stance on abortion, even if this view happens to
be in the minority.  Finally, the Holy See should continue to reiterate
exactly where the true battlefield is on this issue. The battle is not
strictly legal, but also cultural and spiritual.
Wilkins calls for the “need for an academic pro-life response.”251
He states that the “pro-life academic efforts—particularly in compari-
son with those made by scholars and academic organizations that sup-
port abortion rights—have been timid and restrained.”252  Wilkins
points to the major influence of academia because it is “highly prized
in the formulation of international law.”253  Indeed, the American
Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States points to Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, which states, “judicial decisions and the teach-
ings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations” may
be used in ascertaining the state of the law as a source of international
law.254  Accordingly, Wilkins believes that “[t]he redefinition and re-
construction of international norms related to the value of human life
have been planned and executed, in large measures, by members of
the academy” and that “[t]he pro-life academic community can hardly
expect to make significant progress itself until it undertakes similarly
active and focused efforts.”255  Thus, it would greatly benefit the Holy
See to advocate not only to its own community of believers, but those
of other faiths and non-faiths who hold similar views as well.  The
Holy See should make known that a groundswell is needed at the aca-
demic level to make the voice of those who cannot be heard more
prominent in the human rights context, so that a holistic approach to
fundamental human rights might be adopted.
Furthermore, this academic groundswell can assist the legal field
in eradicating ignorance of the Holy See’s position on abortion and
point out the logical flaws in the arguments of opponents.  For exam-
ple, one commentator, Rishona Fleishman, points to the acceptance of
abortion within the Catholic Church by stating the stance of an eight-
eenth century theologian and some exceptional circumstances af-
forded by Pope Gregory XIII.256  However, the fact that a couple
251. Wilkins & Reynolds, supra note 46, at 164.
252. Id. at 135.
253. Id.
254. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 102 (emphasis added).
255. Wilkins & Reynolds, supra note 46, at 164–65.
256. Rishona Fleishman, Comment, The Battle Against Reproductive Rights: The Im-
pact of the Catholic Church on Abortion Law in both International and Domestic
Arenas, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 277, 308 (2000).
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individuals stated abortion was permissible, under whatever circum-
stances they argued for, does not persuasively overturn the explicit
and official stance the Church has had on abortion over the last 2000-
plus years.257  Furthermore, Fleishman attempts to link strong anti-
abortion advocacy and the proclamation of the Immaculate Concep-
tion of Mary, claiming that the proclamation was an elevation of the
“status of women—particularly the ‘sacredness’ of their child-bearing
role in church dogma.”258  Although the Church certainly places a
high esteem on Mary and women in general, but especially in their
sacred role as child-bearers, the use of this Church teaching borders
on the absurd in its attempt to find a connection to the Church’s anti-
abortion advocacy.  The doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of
Mary actually teaches that Mary was conceived without sin.259  To
Fleishman’s credit, the Immaculate Conception of Mary is often mis-
understood to be a proclamation pertaining to Mary’s conception of the
Christ.260  Nonetheless, it remains interesting how Fleishman could
make such a connection.  It is precisely this type of misunderstanding
of Church doctrine that should not be passed over without scrutiny,
especially when it is part of the logical progression of an argument.261
This type of ignorance can only breed further ignorance when it is not
verified by other scholars who are knowledgeable about the faith or at
least by those who take the effort to verify their theology.  Such errors
should not go unchecked in a discipline that should be promoting the
common good.
The second step for the Holy See is the promotion of religious free-
dom.  In a statement by Archbishop Celestino Migliore, Apostolic Nun-
cio and Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations,
His Excellency stated that “the time has come to move be-
yond . . . religious tolerance, and to apply instead the principles of
257. See supra section III.A.
258. Fleishman, supra note 257, at 308.
259. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 200, ¶¶ 490–93.
260. Immaculate Conception and Assumption, CATHOLIC.COM, http://www.catholic.
com/library/Immaculate_Conception_and_Assum.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2011)
(“It’s important to understand what the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception is
and what it is not.  Some people think the term refers to Christ’s conception in
Mary’s womb without the intervention of a human father; but that is the Virgin
Birth.  Others think the Immaculate Conception means Mary was conceived ‘by
the power of the Holy Spirit,’ in the way Jesus was, but that, too, is incorrect.
The Immaculate Conception means that Mary, whose conception was brought
about the normal way, was conceived without original sin or its stain—that’s
what ‘immaculate’ means: without stain.  The essence of original sin consists in
the depravation of sanctifying grace, and its stain is a corrupt nature.  Mary was
preserved from these defects by God’s grace; from the first instant of her exis-
tence she was in the state of sanctifying grace and was free from the corrupt
nature original sin brings.”)
261. Fleishman, supra note 257, at 308–10.
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authentic religious freedom.”262  Archbishop Migliore argued that
there exists a “recurring state of intolerance when group interests or
power struggles seek to prevent religious communities from enlighten-
ing consciences and thus enabling them to act freely and responsibly,
according to the true demands of justice.”263  The height of intolerance
is to exclude these religions from “public debate and cooperation be-
cause they do not agree with options nor conform to practices that are
contrary to human dignity.”264  Human rights dialogue demands that
“[n]ational and global decision making, legal and political systems,
and all people of good will must cooperate to ensure that diverse relig-
ious expressions are not restricted or silenced.”265  This approach out-
lined by Archbishop Migliore would sustain the diversity of voices that
is essential to international human rights law discussion.  When cer-
tain governments or individuals call for the total exclusion of groups
from the outset of the discussion, no longer is there dialogue, but a
form of totalitarianism is substituted where only those with the “cor-
rect” voice are welcomed to enter the human rights forum.
Along these lines, the Holy See should additionally continue to pro-
claim its stance on the issue of life, recognizing the dignity of the
human person beginning at conception.  As a reality, the Catholic
Church has maintained this stance since its inception.266  Therefore,
it cannot be reasonably assumed that the Catholic Church will begin
arguing a different position any time soon.  However, this does not
mean that the Catholic Church is unaware that its beliefs are not the
norm or in sync with the majority.  In fact, as Wagner states, the
Church acknowledges its role as “one intermediate social organization
among others, devoted to charity and voluntary giving.”267  This ac-
knowledgement that it is one among many, however, in no way should
inhibit the Holy See from continuing to defend its position.  The Holy
See must maintain its position that life is a fundamental human right
that begins at conception, and such a right is neither relative to the
preference of an individual, nation, or international regime nor is the
right to life to be subordinated to other, inferior rights based on some
utilitarian calculus.  It must be made clear that the right to life is the
262. H.E. Archbishop Celestino Migliore, Permanent Observer of the Holy See, State-
ment at the 61st Session of the UN General Assembly, Before the Third Commit-
tee, on Item 67(b): Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Human Rights
Questions, Including Alternative Approaches for Improving the Effective Enjoy-
ment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Oct. 27, 2006) [hereinafter





266. See supra section III.A.
267. Wagner, supra note 210, at 270.
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precondition upon which every other right derives; the right to life is a
sine qua non of international human rights law.
Finally, the Holy See must continue to identify where the battle-
field in this war truly lies.  The battle is not exclusively a legal one.  It
is a cultural battle and, for the Catholic Church, a spiritual battle.
Archbishop Migliore states that
[t]he rights of persons are not simply a set of legal norms but represent, above
all, fundamental values.  Such values must be fostered by society, otherwise
they risk disappearing even from legislative text.  The dignity of persons must
be safeguarded in culture, in the public mentality and in the conduct of soci-
ety, as a precondition and in order to be protected by the law.268
In other words, rule of law is a mechanism by which the state can
come to recognize the dignity of persons.  The law is not an end in
itself—in fact, the law is often incorrect and imperfect.  Thus, the ad-
vice of Jacques Maritain that the human community should not expect
too much from the Declaration269 was not so much words of prophecy
as much as it was a basic truth about the ability of the law to ensure
total justice.
The fact that the law will fall short indicates all the more that it is
the culture that must be transformed more so than the law.  Arch-
bishop Migliore used the words of the current Holy Father, Pope Bene-
dict XVI, when issuing a statement concerning social transformation,
stating that what the fight really needs is “men and women who live
in a profoundly fraternal way and are able to accompany individuals,
families and communities on journeys of authentic human
development.”270
This cultural battle also involves reshaping the understanding of
what it means to have rights.  The Compendium of the Social Doctrine
of the Church (Compendium) states that “[i]nextricably connected to
the topic of rights is the issue of duties falling to men and women.”271
Quoting Pope John XXIII from his encyclical, Pacem in Terris (Peace
on Earth), the Compendium states, “Those, therefore, who claim their
own rights, yet altogether forget or neglect to carry out their respec-
tive duties, are people who build with one hand and destroy with the
other.”272  Thus, to talk about a so-called unfettered right to abortion,
or any right to abortion for that matter, ignores the duty that is owed
268. Statement on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, supra note 262.
269. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
270. H.E. Archbishop Celestino Migliore, Permanent Observer of the Holy See, State-
ment before the Economic and Social Council, 47th Session of the Commission for
Social Development, On Item 6(a), Priority Theme: Social Integration (Feb. 5,
2009), available at http://www.holyseemission.org/5Feb2009.html.
271. PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOC-
TRINE OF THE CHURCH 68 (2004).
272. Id. at 67 (quoting Encyclical Letter, Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris (Apr. 11,
1963), available at, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/docu
ments/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html).
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to the innocent child that was conceived, a child who should have been
afforded a right to life.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it should be stated emphatically that the current
state of the law should not be read as elevating abortion to the level of
an international human right.  However, the reality that it could at-
tain such status is not inconceivable with the large movement of those
who urge that it should be recognized as a right.  At most, the current
state of law only speaks of a woman’s ability to have an abortion under
certain exceptional circumstances.  These exceptional circumstances
are when her life or health is in danger or the pregnancy is the result
of rape or incest.  While the rights of the unborn child are scant under
international human rights law, it is perhaps necessary (and de-
manded by justice) that some explicit provision be accepted articulat-
ing the right to life of an unborn child—at the very least, where none
of the exceptions just mentioned apply.
To date, the Holy See, as a Permanent Observer to the United Na-
tions, has done a great amount of work in protecting the life of the
unborn child.  Because there remains ambiguity within all of this legal
discussion, it is important that the Holy See remain a prominent fig-
ure in this heated and passionate dialogue.  The Holy See must re-
main steadfast and continue fighting the battle it fights at the various
levels of social interaction.  Its voice, although one among many, is
important to an authentic human rights dialogue and is an invaluable
resource to the many unborn children who go without a voice.
